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AMERICAN
LAW:
1836-1937.
By Herbert
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. i99i. Pp. x,

AND
1

Contemporary American legal historiography is divided into two
antagonistic approaches. The "Chicago School" venerates the nineteenth-century common law for its enduring ability to attain politically
neutral, wealth-maximizing results. 2 At the other extreme, a variety
of radical and populist approaches emphasizes the redistributive and, hence, inherently political - function of the law of the same
period. 3 In Enterprise and American Law: 1836-1937, Professor
Herbert Hovenkamp self-consciously attempts to position himself between these two approaches (pp. 5-7). In arguing that economic
theory offers a more accurate account of nineteenth-century judicial
decisionmaking than does interest group politics, 4 he hopes to restore
to nineteenth-century law the logical consistency of which left-leaning
legal historians have robbed it (p. 6). At the same time, he purports
to stop short of embracing the Chicago School emphasis upon politically neutral wealth maximization. 5 Although Professor Hovenkamp's
attempt at a centrist historiography proves futile, the result is an
illuminating exploration of the relationship between dominant economic and jurisprudential models in the nineteenth century.
Professor Hovenkamp believes that classical economic theory dominated American economic thought through the tumultuous century
that lasted from the Jacksonian Era to the New Deal. Its core precepts were astonishingly simple: first, markets work well when left to
themselves (p. 4); and second, state intervention inevitably risks disrupting the smooth functioning of the market by favoring certain
interests over others (p. 4). According to Professor Hovenkamp, this
suggests that classical economic theory "purported to develop rules for
evaluating a legal regime's justness or fairness without regard to how
IBen

V. and Dorothy Willie Distinguished Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.
2 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 66, 81-82 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient!,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 (977).
- For a summary of radical and populist historiographical approaches, see Robert Gordon,
The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Functions of History
in Legal Argumnent, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Terrence MacDonald
ed., forthcoming x992).

4See infra note 14.
5The Chicago School position is founded upon the political neutrality of wealth-maximizing
law and economics. In contrast, Professor Hovenkamp asserts that "Ithere is no dichotomy
between science and politics" (p. 7). Professor Hovenkamp also levels substantive criticisms at
the Chicago School position elsewhere. See infra notes 14-16.
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its wealth happened to be distributed" (p. 3). Because it pursued
wealth maximization at the expense of redistributive concerns, classical economic theory protected itself from blatantly political manipulation by interest groups. Hence, although he acknowledges its political origins (p. 4), Professor Hovenkamp maintains that classical
economic theory was - albeit in a highly limited sense - politically
neutral.
Professor Hovenkamp offers several illustrations of the impact of
classical economic theory upon judicial decisionmaking. In "The Classical Corporation and State Policy" (pp. 9-64), he describes how preclassical notions of the corporation as an entity created by the state
for a special purpose (typically with monopoly privileges) succumbed
to classical notions of the corporation as a device for assembling and
controlling large amounts of capital. 6 In "The Economic Constitution"
(pp. 65-101), Professor Hovenkamp identifies the relationship between
classical economic theory's distaste for state regulation and the Taney
Court's (1836-1864) narrow reading of the Commerce Clause 7 (p. 8i).
In "The Rise of Regulated Industry" (pp. 103-68), he provides a
fascinating economic analysis of regulation in the context of the
Slaughter-House Cases8 (pp. 116-24) and the railroads (pp. 131-68)
and argues that classical economic theory mandated the competitionpreserving result in both cases. "The Political Economy of Substantive
Due Process" (pp. 169-204) asserts that "the judges who developed
substantive due process . . . separat[ed] those laws that they saw as
tending to the production of wealth from those that they did not" (p.
176). Finally, "The Labor Combination in American Law" (pp. 20538) suggests that classical economic theory's distrust of cartels explains
the nineteenth-century judiciary's hostility toward labor unions.
Throughout these illustrations, Professor Hovenkamp emphasizes that
American judges were familiar with at least the rudiments of classical
economic theory, which they consciously employed in their decisionmaking (pp. 96-99).
According to Professor Hovenkamp, classical economic theory
reigned supreme in judicial decisionmaking only as long as it dictated
results that tended to maximize wealth.) In "The Antitrust Movement

6 According to Professor Hovenkamp, this shift is clearly illustrated in Charles River Bridge
v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (ii Pet.) 420 0837), which he characterizes as "fundamentally a
dispute about state policy toward natural monopoly" (p. 6).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (873).
9 Professor Hovenkamp argues that economic - and, more generally, scientific - models
become dominant when they convince those who apply them (p. 7). At the same time, he
maintains that common law judges "accepted the distribution of wealth and power they found
and determined which rule would maximize wealth within that scheme." Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645, 66o (083). Taken together, these
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and the Theory of the Firm" (pp. 239-347), he explores the mounting
tension between classical economic theory's abhorrence of redistributive state regulation and late nineteenth-century economic phenomena
that urgently demanded state regulation, such as the rise of the giant
corporation (pp. 241-67), the problems posed by monopolies (pp. 268347), and a recalcitrant labor movement (pp. 207-08). By the 1930s,
the imperfect competition models of Joan Robinson lo (p. 356) and the
institutional theories of Berle and Means' 1 (pp. 357-62) seemed more
capable of producing wealth-maximizing results than did classical
economic theory. Hence, according to Professor Hovenkamp, classical
economic theory lost its paradigmatic status and was subsequently
abandoned by the judiciary. 12
Professor Hovenkamp's account of the fortunes of classical political

economy reveals his vision of economic and jurisprudential change in
the nineteenth century. His position can be distilled to the following
propositions: courts incorporated dominant economic models into judicial decisionmaking as long as these models maximized wealth under
existing economic conditions; when these models - as a result of
changes in these economic conditions - could no longer maximize
wealth, courts shifted to emerging models that could. In other words,
by employing different economic models over time, courts were continually involved in wealth maximization.' 3
Professor Hovenkamp's vision of economic and jurisprudential
change is consistent with his assertion that judicial decisionmaking
cannot be reduced to interest group conflict. 14 However, Professor
ideas suggest that an economic model would be incorporated into judicial decisionmaking only
as long as it was wealth-maximizing.
10 See JOAN ROBINSON, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
11See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
12 Although Professor Hovenkamp never explicitly argues as much, presumably he would
illustrate the judiciary's abandonment of classical economic theory by pointing to its deference
to New Deal legislation based on concepts of imperfect competition. See, e.g., West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
'-Professor Hovenkamp's treatment of pre-classical or mercantilist economic theory suggests
that he entertains a general vision of economic and jurisprudential change driven by wealth
maximization, not merely one unique to classical economic theory. According to Professor
Hovenkamp, pre-classical economic theory dominated American political economy only as long
as its emphasis on monopoly privileges was perceived as "essential to economic development"
(p. iS). When pre-classical theory was unable to legitimize the strongly competitive market that
wealth maximization seemed to dictate, it was abandoned by the judiciary that, in the context
of the Contract Clause, "responded [to vestiges of pre-Classical business subsidies] by developing

a set of doctrines designed to limit state power to subsidize new business" (p. 28).
14 Asserting that "[tlheory has always been an essential part of state policy," Professor
Hovenkamp argues that "look[ing] exclusively at political concerns in economic policymaking
results in a misleading and limited perspective on American legal development" (p. 6). This is
reinforced by his assertion that classical economic theory insulated itself from interest group
capture.
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Hovenkamp appears to harbor a far more ambitious claim to political
neutrality. He seems to argue that all wealth-maximizing judicial
decisionmaking is politically neutral, not merely because it is above
crass interest group politics, but also because wealth maximization is
itself politically neutral. Both the timelessness of wealth maximization
in Professor Hovenkamp's analysis and his restrained criticism of the
political neutrality claimed for wealth maximization by the Chicago
School' 3 suggest such a conclusion.
Unfortunately, Professor Hovenkamp's apparent belief in the political neutrality of wealth maximization is irreconcilable with his
espousal of a centrist position in the historiographical debate. To be
sure, Professor Hovenkamp has energetically criticized the Chicago
School for applying wealth maximization to areas of human experience, such as human rights in which he believes it should not be
applied.1 6 Furthermore, unlike the Chicago School, he displays little
reverence for the common law. 17 Nonetheless, at least in the context
of this book, the differences between Professor Hovenkamp and the
Chicago School seem peripheral: both deem central the idea that
wealth-maximizing judicial decisionmaking is politically neutral. Consequently, both are vulnerable to the general criticism that the political
neutrality of wealth maximization is illusory. I8
Neither Professor Hovenkamp nor the Chicago School can escape
the fact that courts differ critically from theoretical economic models
that focus only upon allocative efficiency and purport to leave redistributive choices to the political sphere. 19 Unlike economic models,
courts construct -

and then perpetuate -

the initial set of entitle-

ments by making unavoidably redistributive choices between competIsProfessor Hovenkamp disputes the Chicago School argument that both "efficiency [wealth
maximization] and welfare refer to how big the pie is, but say nothing about how to divide it."
Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 8I5, 848 (i99o). In
contrast to the Chicago School, Professor Hovenkamp does not equate welfare maximization
with wealth maximization; he asserts instead that welfare-maximizing decisions must be made
once wealth-maximizing results have been attained. However, like the Chicago School, he never
questions the political neutrality of wealth maximization itself.
16 See id. at 833-35.
17 Professor Hovenkamp rejects the Chicago School attachment to neoclassical economics as
a timeless mechanism for achieving wealth maximization. This is evident in his view that
"[wihat is important is whether one model seems to work better [than another] in a given
context." Id. at 827 (emphasis added). This does not, however, detract from his view that the
goal of wealth maximization is itself a timeless and politically neutral one.
Is See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the
Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591, 627-33 (980).
19The allocative-redistributive distinction central to the Chicago School argument is based
upon the difference between politically neutral allocative efficiency (or wealth maximization) and
politically nonneutral redistributive efficiency. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology
of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 5-6 (1953) (arguing that wealthmaximizing results may be derived from nonpolitical postulates).
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ing entitlement claims. Because this initial set of entitlements dictates
which of a given number of results is wealth-maximizing, the judicial
pursuit of wealth maximization is

-

albeit in a limited sense

-

also

redistributive. Furthermore, it is absurd to suggest that courts can
pursue a politically neutral allocative efficiency while relying upon
legislatures to make the appropriate redistributive choices. As courts
are well aware, because legislatures fail all too often to perform the
task of wealth redistribution, the adverse redistributive consequences
of wealth-maximizing judicial decisionmaking are never corrected.
Hence, Professor Hovenkamp has not established the political neutrality of nineteenth-century judicial decisionmaking simply by arguing
that it opted for allocative efficiency. At times, he appears to admit
as much. For example, his discussion of the "The Labor Combination
in American Law" notes that late nineteenth-century courts consistently arrived at anti-labor decisions that - although perhaps allocatively efficient - had "devastating" redistributive consequences (p.
208).

Moreover, the politics inherent in judicial decisionmaking are inescapable even if wealth maximization could somehow be separated
from wealth redistribution. Claiming that law is politics, critical legal
studies scholarship postulates that because law is indeterminate,
judges can give it specific content in the adjudication of cases only by
invoking independent political commitments. 20 Wealth maximization
- certainly at the level of generality at which Professor Hovenkamp
describes it - seems similarly indeterminate and hence similarly susceptible to infinite judicial interpretation. 2 1 For instance, wealth maximization could dictate several different outcomes - more or less
hostile toward labor - depending upon how one assesses the economic
costs and benefits of different sets of entitlements.
The indeterminacy of wealth maximization is underscored by the
fact that Professor Hovenkamp's claim that economic theory and judicial decisionmaking are linked in a one-way causal relationship is
ultimately unverifiable. Professor Hovenkamp demonstrates only that
dominant economic and jurisprudential models are correlated, and not
-

as he promises 22 -

that the former caused the latter. However,

it is possible to establish other, completely different correlations that
are at least as persuasive as Professor Hovenkamp's argument. For
20 See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1677-79 (1982).
21 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 Am. U. L. REv. 939, 990-91 (x985) (arguing that economic theory
serves to imbue a system with objectivity and thus conceal its actual malleability).
22At the beginning of his book, Professor Hovenkamp argues that, in the realm of judicial
decisionmaking, "theory was the dog and politics but the tail" (p. 6). This suggests a one-way
causal relationship between economic theory and judicial decisionmaking.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:785

example, when Professor Hovenkamp's identification of the Protestant
roots of classical economic theory (p. 68) is combined with the widely
23
accepted sociological nexus between Protestantism and capitalism,
it is equally convincing to identify Protestantism as the "cause" of
economic and jurisprudential change.
More significantly, and more damagingly for Professor Hovenkamp's argument, it is often the case that statutory impulses, originating independently of and even counter to dominant economic models, influence the structure of the economy, which in turn generates
24
dominant economic models. Recognizing this reverse relationship,
Professor Hovenkamp observes that the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890,25 with its overtly redistributive motivations, was passed during
the dominance of classical economic theory (p. 242). As a result, it
was part of judicial decisionmaking almost forty years before imperfect
competition models became dominant (pp. 244-49). This suggests that
law often influences and reorders the real world for reasons that have
little to do with economics, which responds to this reordering by
rethinking its own internal precepts.
These alternatives to Professor Hovenkamp's position point toward
precisely the conclusion that he attempts so energetically to overcome.
Explicitly political factors - such as the redistributive impulses of
statutory law or Protestantism - imbue the law with the "taint" of
full-blown interest group politics, often overriding the more neutral
mandate of economic theory. Professor Hovenkamp's postulated oneway relationship between economic theory and judicial decisionmaking is no more than an intriguing, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt
to introduce order into a whirlpool of political cross-currents. By
attempting to demonstrate that economic theory placed judicial decisionmaking above crass interest group politics, his analysis facilitates
our understanding of the logical relationship between economic theory
and judicial decisionmaking, but does little more.
23 The best known example of this thesis is MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Scribner 1958) (1905).
24 At the end of his discussion of the antitrust movement, Professor Hovenkamp notes that
many of economic theory's notions of imperfect competition "were really borrowed from the
law" (p. 347). However, immediately thereafter, he restates his thesis that nineteenth-century
American lawyers "borrowed their ideas wholesale from classical political economy" (p. 347).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).

